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determinations by operation of law did not unconstitutionally confer
adjudicative power on the state engineer." Acknowledging USF's
ability to seek leave of court to excuse its untimely objection, the court
concluded that until USF explored that remedy, HCIC was entitled to
the ten cfs water right reflected in the State Engineer's proposed
award.
Thus, because USF did not object to the proposed determination
within ninety days, the trial court lacked authority to hear an action
that could result in a judgment inconsistent with an uncontested
determination.
Therefore, the court held the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over this claim and vacated the judgment.
Jessica L. Grether

Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 82 P.3d 1125
(Utah 2003) (holding that Utah Water Conservancy Act did not create
standing for a water conservancy district to bring cause of action for
forfeiture; and party protesting a change application does not gain
standing, by virtue of the protest, to petition the court for a
declaration of forfeiture).
The Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints ("CPB") submitted a change application to
the State Engineer for certain water rights located in Washington
County, Utah. The Washington County Water Conservancy District
("Conservancy District") submitted a challenge to the change
application, asserting that CPB forfeited some of its water rights. The
State Engineer granted CPB's request, noting that it lacked
jurisdiction to determine whether CPB forfeited its water rights. The
Conservancy District then petitioned the Washington County District
Court challenging the State Engineer's determination of the change
application, and charged that CPB had forfeited the water rights at
issue. The trial court ruled that the Conservancy District lacked
standing to bring its cause of action and the Conservancy District
appealed directly to the Utah Supreme Court.
On appeal, the court considered three issues: (1) whether the
Utah Water Conservancy Act ("Act") granted standing to the
Conservancy District, (2) whether the Conservancy District's
participation in the change application proceedings gave standing to
challenge the state engineer's determination, and (3) whether the
Conservancy District qualified for standing under traditional standing
requirements.
First, in addressing standing under the Act, the court concluded
that the Act did not grant the Conservancy District standing. The
court reached this conclusion by noting that the Act contained broad
statements outlining the purposes of conservancy districts. Subsequent
to these broad statements were specific powers that the legislature
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delegated to conservancy districts. The court noted that none of the
delegated specific powers granted standing to challenge water rights or
to appeal the State Engineer's determinations with respect to change
applications. Finally, the court rejected the Conservancy District's
argument that members of a class protected by a statute have standing
to enforce the statute. The court reasoned that many statutes protect
large classes generally, but this fact did not grant standing to those
general members to press for enforcement of those statutes.
Next, the court addressed whether participation in the change
application proceedings gave the Conservancy District standing. Utah
law permits "interested" persons to file protests with the State
Engineer. It also permits persons who are "aggrieved" because of
actions taken by the State Engineer to obtain judicial review of those
actions. The Conservancy District argued that because it was an
"interested" person who was "aggrieved" by the State Engineer's
determination, it therefore obtained standing to challenge the State
Engineer's determination in court. The court concluded that not
every "interested" person is necessarily "aggrieved." The court held
that to be "aggrieved," a person must show a particularized injury.
Further, the court cautioned that if the court allowed every
"interested" person to become "aggrieved" whenever the State
Engineer ignores a protest, water rights that would not otherwise be
subject to challenge would be easier to contest.
Finally, as to traditional standing principles, the Conservancy
District argued that the trial court incorrectly applied the traditional
standing test. The trial court stated that a party seeking standing must
demonstrate that that they would suffer a distinct and palpable injury
giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome. Here the trial court
required the Conservancy District to show a particularized harm, to
show some connection between the Conservancy District's use and
CPB's use. The court held this was not a new test as the Conservancy
District had argued, but the traditional test, and concluded that the
trial court did not incorrectly apply the traditional standing test. Next,
the court reviewed the Conservancy District's evidence that allegedly
supported a connection between CPB's use and the Conservancy
District's use. The relevant inquiry was whether CPB's underground
supply was part of the Ash Creek hydrological system. The court
concluded that the trial court had ample evidence to reach its
conclusion and therefore upheld the trial court's decision. According
to the court, three exceptions exist to the standing requirement: (1)
no one has a greater interest in the outcome, (2) the issues will not
ever be raised unless the plaintiff is granted standing to raise them,
and (3) the legal issues are sufficiently crystallized for immediate
judicial resolution. If none of the requirements apply, then a plaintiff
may qualify for standing if the issues are "so unique and of such great
importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public
interest." The court concluded that none of the exceptions applied in
this case. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling.
Robert E. Wells

